| Title | Esencia y existencia en Avicenna y Averroes |
| Translation | Essence and Existence in Avicenna and Averroes |
| Type | Article |
| Language | Spanish |
| Date | 2009 |
| Journal | Al-Qanṭara |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 403–426 |
| Categories | Metaphysics |
| Author(s) | Catarina Belo |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| This article explores the views on existence of medieval Muslim philosophers Avicenna (d. 1037) and Averroes (d. 1198), whose works followed closely the philosophy of Aristotle. In addition to the Aristotelian influence, which permeated all medieval Islamic philosophy, Avicenna and Averroes were also inspired by Islamic theology, known in Arabic as kalām. The distinction between essence and existence is one of the most central and controversial aspects of Avicenna's philosophy, together with his claim that existence is an accident. Averroes in turn has a radically different conception of existence, identifying it with existing beings rather than considering it as something in itself. With the Latin translation of Avicenna's metaphysical works in the 12th century, the Avicennian distinction went on to shape much of the debate on existence in medieval Scholastic philosophy and beyond. This article assesses the meaning of the distinction in Avicenna as well as Averroes' criticism. In explicating their radically different views on existence, it also touches on later discussions concerning existence, for example the issue whether existence is a predicate, in the Modern Age. |
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| Title | Ibn Rushd on God's Decree and Determination (al-qaḍāʾ wa-l-qadar) |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2009 |
| Journal | Al-Qanṭara |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 245–264 |
| Categories | Metaphysics |
| Author(s) | Catarina Belo |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| This article is based on Ibn Rushd's chapter on God's qaḍāʾ wa-qadar, which adresses the question of predestination, as illustrative of a rationalistic approach that introduces philosophical views into an age-old religious debate. My aim is to present Ibn Rushd's argument, which has unmistakable Aristotelian overtones; therefore, the harmonization of religion and philosophy implicit in his argument is one of the points I would like to explore in this paper. In the same way, I am interested in discussing whether Ibn Rushd's proposed solution constitutes a middle way between two opposite positions and solves the perennial problem of determinism. The paper also discusses the issue whether he supports predestination, i.e., the view that events are predetermined by God before they happen. |
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| Title | O essencial sobre Averróis |
| Type | Monograph |
| Language | undefined |
| Date | 2007 |
| Publication Place | Lisbon |
| Publisher | Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda |
| Categories | Metaphysics |
| Author(s) | Catarina Belo |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
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| Title | Chance and Determinism in Avicenna and Averroes |
| Type | Monograph |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2007 |
| Publication Place | Leiden, Boston |
| Publisher | Brill |
| Series | Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science |
| Volume | 69 |
| Categories | Avicenna, Physics, Metaphysics, Relation between Philosophy and Theology |
| Author(s) | Catarina Belo |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| This book examines the question whether medieval Muslim philosophers Avicenna (Arabic Ibn Sīnā 980-1037) and Averroes (Arabic Ibn Rushd 1126-1198) are determinists. With a focus on physics and metaphysics it studies their views on chance events in nature, as well as matter, in particular prime matter, and divine providence. In addition it sets their positions against the historical/philosophical background that influenced their response, the Greco-Arabic philosophical tradition - Aristotelian and Neoplatonic - on the one hand, and the tradition of Islamic theology (kalām) on the other. In comparing their philosophical systems, it lays emphasis on the way in which Avicenna and Averroes use these traditions to offer an original answer to the problem of determinism. |
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| Title | Averroes on God's Knowledge of Particulars |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2006 |
| Journal | Journal of Islamic Studies |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 177–199 |
| Categories | Metaphysics |
| Author(s) | Catarina Belo |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| This article discusses a central issue in the debate between philosophy and theology in the Islamic Middle Ages. In his attempt to show that Greek philosophy was contrary to Islam, theologian al-Ghazzālī charged Muslim philosophers with unbelief (kufr) on three counts: the eternity of the world, bodily resurrection and God's knowledge of particulars. The latter was particularly significant within an Islamic context. If God does not know particulars, how can He know for instance individual prophets or pass judgement on Doomsday? The main target of al-Ghazālī's criticism was Avicenna and his contention that God knows particulars in a universal way. In the Aristotelian epistemological model followed by Avicenna the subject and object of knowledge become one in the epistemological process. Since God is immutable He cannot know particulars in time, therefore He must know individuals insofar as they are universal.In his response to al-Ghazzālī, Averroes' main contribution is his rejection of Avicenna's formulation that God knows particulars in a universal way. Averroes criticizes this view because it does away with the distinction between divine and human knowledge. While in humans the process of knowing entails abstraction of universals from individual substances, God's knowledge cannot be characterized as universal or particular. It is neither particular—because it does not involve sense experience—nor universal—because it is not abstracted from individuals.Consequently, Averroes presents the essence of God's knowledge as at bottom unknowable to the human mind. This position may resemble al-Ghazzālī's overall negative stance concerning our understanding of this issue but in actuality it is radically different. By way of stating what it is not, and by clearly showing the differences between divine and human knowledge, Averroes provides a clearer grasp of what divine knowledge must be like. |
| Online Access | ttps://www.jstor.org/stable/26199485 |
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| Title | Averroes on God's Knowledge of Particulars |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2006 |
| Journal | Journal of Islamic Studies |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 177–199 |
| Categories | Metaphysics |
| Author(s) | Catarina Belo |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| This article discusses a central issue in the debate between philosophy and theology in the Islamic Middle Ages. In his attempt to show that Greek philosophy was contrary to Islam, theologian al-Ghazzālī charged Muslim philosophers with unbelief (kufr) on three counts: the eternity of the world, bodily resurrection and God's knowledge of particulars. The latter was particularly significant within an Islamic context. If God does not know particulars, how can He know for instance individual prophets or pass judgement on Doomsday? The main target of al-Ghazālī's criticism was Avicenna and his contention that God knows particulars in a universal way. In the Aristotelian epistemological model followed by Avicenna the subject and object of knowledge become one in the epistemological process. Since God is immutable He cannot know particulars in time, therefore He must know individuals insofar as they are universal.In his response to al-Ghazzālī, Averroes' main contribution is his rejection of Avicenna's formulation that God knows particulars in a universal way. Averroes criticizes this view because it does away with the distinction between divine and human knowledge. While in humans the process of knowing entails abstraction of universals from individual substances, God's knowledge cannot be characterized as universal or particular. It is neither particular—because it does not involve sense experience—nor universal—because it is not abstracted from individuals.Consequently, Averroes presents the essence of God's knowledge as at bottom unknowable to the human mind. This position may resemble al-Ghazzālī's overall negative stance concerning our understanding of this issue but in actuality it is radically different. By way of stating what it is not, and by clearly showing the differences between divine and human knowledge, Averroes provides a clearer grasp of what divine knowledge must be like. |
| Online Access | ttps://www.jstor.org/stable/26199485 |
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| Title | Chance and Determinism in Avicenna and Averroes |
| Type | Monograph |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2007 |
| Publication Place | Leiden, Boston |
| Publisher | Brill |
| Series | Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science |
| Volume | 69 |
| Categories | Avicenna, Physics, Metaphysics, Relation between Philosophy and Theology |
| Author(s) | Catarina Belo |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| This book examines the question whether medieval Muslim philosophers Avicenna (Arabic Ibn Sīnā 980-1037) and Averroes (Arabic Ibn Rushd 1126-1198) are determinists. With a focus on physics and metaphysics it studies their views on chance events in nature, as well as matter, in particular prime matter, and divine providence. In addition it sets their positions against the historical/philosophical background that influenced their response, the Greco-Arabic philosophical tradition - Aristotelian and Neoplatonic - on the one hand, and the tradition of Islamic theology (kalām) on the other. In comparing their philosophical systems, it lays emphasis on the way in which Avicenna and Averroes use these traditions to offer an original answer to the problem of determinism. |
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| Title | Esencia y existencia en Avicenna y Averroes |
| Translation | Essence and Existence in Avicenna and Averroes |
| Type | Article |
| Language | Spanish |
| Date | 2009 |
| Journal | Al-Qanṭara |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 403–426 |
| Categories | Metaphysics |
| Author(s) | Catarina Belo |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| This article explores the views on existence of medieval Muslim philosophers Avicenna (d. 1037) and Averroes (d. 1198), whose works followed closely the philosophy of Aristotle. In addition to the Aristotelian influence, which permeated all medieval Islamic philosophy, Avicenna and Averroes were also inspired by Islamic theology, known in Arabic as kalām. The distinction between essence and existence is one of the most central and controversial aspects of Avicenna's philosophy, together with his claim that existence is an accident. Averroes in turn has a radically different conception of existence, identifying it with existing beings rather than considering it as something in itself. With the Latin translation of Avicenna's metaphysical works in the 12th century, the Avicennian distinction went on to shape much of the debate on existence in medieval Scholastic philosophy and beyond. This article assesses the meaning of the distinction in Avicenna as well as Averroes' criticism. In explicating their radically different views on existence, it also touches on later discussions concerning existence, for example the issue whether existence is a predicate, in the Modern Age. |
{"_index":"bib","_type":"_doc","_id":"1379","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1379,"authors_free":[{"id":1571,"entry_id":1379,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":1254,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Catarina Belo","free_first_name":"Catarina","free_last_name":"Belo","norm_person":{"id":1254,"first_name":"Catarina","last_name":"Belo","full_name":"Catarina Belo","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":0,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/132895374","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":1,"link":"bib?authors[]=Catarina Belo"}}],"entry_title":"Esencia y existencia en Avicenna y Averroes","title_transcript":null,"title_translation":"Essence and Existence in Avicenna and Averroes","main_title":{"title":"Esencia y existencia en Avicenna y Averroes"},"abstract":"This article explores the views on existence of medieval Muslim philosophers Avicenna (d. 1037) and Averroes (d. 1198), whose works followed closely the philosophy of Aristotle. In addition to the Aristotelian influence, which permeated all medieval Islamic philosophy, Avicenna and Averroes were also inspired by Islamic theology, known in Arabic as kal\u0101m. The distinction between essence and existence is one of the most central and controversial aspects of Avicenna's philosophy, together with his claim that existence is an accident. Averroes in turn has a radically different conception of existence, identifying it with existing beings rather than considering it as something in itself. With the Latin translation of Avicenna's metaphysical works in the 12th century, the Avicennian distinction went on to shape much of the debate on existence in medieval Scholastic philosophy and beyond. This article assesses the meaning of the distinction in Avicenna as well as Averroes' criticism. In explicating their radically different views on existence, it also touches on later discussions concerning existence, for example the issue whether existence is a predicate, in the Modern Age.","btype":3,"date":"2009","language":"Spanish","online_url":null,"doi_url":null,"ti_url":null,"categories":[{"id":31,"category_name":"Metaphysics","link":"bib?categories[]=Metaphysics"}],"authors":[{"id":1254,"full_name":"Catarina Belo","role":1}],"works":[],"republication_of":null,"translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1379,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Al-Qan\u1e6dara","volume":"30","issue":"2","pages":"403\u2013426"}},"sort":["Esencia y existencia en Avicenna y Averroes"]}
| Title | Ibn Rushd on God's Decree and Determination (al-qaḍāʾ wa-l-qadar) |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2009 |
| Journal | Al-Qanṭara |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 245–264 |
| Categories | Metaphysics |
| Author(s) | Catarina Belo |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| This article is based on Ibn Rushd's chapter on God's qaḍāʾ wa-qadar, which adresses the question of predestination, as illustrative of a rationalistic approach that introduces philosophical views into an age-old religious debate. My aim is to present Ibn Rushd's argument, which has unmistakable Aristotelian overtones; therefore, the harmonization of religion and philosophy implicit in his argument is one of the points I would like to explore in this paper. In the same way, I am interested in discussing whether Ibn Rushd's proposed solution constitutes a middle way between two opposite positions and solves the perennial problem of determinism. The paper also discusses the issue whether he supports predestination, i.e., the view that events are predetermined by God before they happen. |
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| Title | O essencial sobre Averróis |
| Type | Monograph |
| Language | undefined |
| Date | 2007 |
| Publication Place | Lisbon |
| Publisher | Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda |
| Categories | Metaphysics |
| Author(s) | Catarina Belo |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
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