| Title | Averroismi al plurale. La ricezione del Tafsîr kitâb al-nafs di Ibn Rushd nel Commento alle Sentenze di Tommaso d’Aquino |
| Type | Article |
| Language | Italian |
| Date | 2017 |
| Journal | Dianoia |
| Volume | 24 |
| Pages | 15-32 |
| Categories | Aristotle, Commentary, De anima, Averroism, Siger of Brabant, Thomas |
| Author(s) | Federico Minzoni |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| A widespread historiographic commonplace, established by Thomas Aquinas himself in his Tractatus de unitate intellectus (1270), takes Siger of Brabant’s Quaestiones in tertium de anima (ca. 1265) to be a latin formulation of Ibn Rušd’s theory of the unity of the material intellect as exposed in the Tafsīr Kitāb al-Nafs (Long Commentary on the De anima, ca. 1186); according to the same view, Aquinas’ philosophy of mind would be the expression of a strongly antiaverroistic – and therefore more orthodox – kind of aristotelianism. Building on a thorough analysis of key texts in Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences (1255), I argue in this paper that those who hold Aquinas’ noetic to be anti-averroistic are greatly mistaken: while Siger’s always superficial rushdian inspiration is better understood against the background of a neoplatonic-tinged mind-body dualism clearly at odds with Ibn Rušd’s own strictly peripatetic ontology, Aquinas’ psychology, hylomorfic and not-dualist at its core, is aristotelian mainly inasmuch as it is rushdian. |
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| Title | Pomponazzi Contra Averroes on the Intellect |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2016 |
| Journal | British Journal for the History of Philosophy |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 45–66 |
| Categories | Renaissance, De anima, Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Thomas |
| Author(s) | John Sellars |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| This paper examines Pomponazzi's arguments against Averroes in his De Immortalitate Animae, focusing on the question whether thought is possible without a body. The first part of the paper will sketch the history of the problem, namely the interpretation of Aristotle's remarks about the intellect in De Anima 3.4-5, touching on Alexander, Themistius, and Averroes. The second part will focus on Pomponazzi's response to Averroes, including his use of arguments by Aquinas. It will conclude by suggesting that Pomponazzi's discussion stands as the first properly modern account of Aristotle's psychology. |
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| Title | The Will in Averroes and Aquinas |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2013 |
| Journal | Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association |
| Volume | 87 |
| Pages | 231-247 |
| Categories | Thomas, Aristotle, De anima |
| Author(s) | Traci Phillipson |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| Despite the drastic differences in their views of the intellect and the location and specific function of the will both Aquinas and Averroes are able to claim that their systems allow for moral agency because they both place the will—a faculty that is of prime importance to the process of moral action—in the individual. Both philosophers think that they are following Aristotle in making their claims about the will and the intellects. This paper will examine the issue of will and the related issue of the intellects as it appears in the Aristotelian texts and in the subsequent work of Averroes and Aquinas. It will argue that at least some of the divergence in Averroes and Aquinas can be attributed to an issue of translation regarding De Anima, and a difference in the role of cogitation and the intellects regarding will. |
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| Title | Averroismi al plurale. La ricezione del Tafsîr kitâb al-nafs di Ibn Rushd nel Commento alle Sentenze di Tommaso d’Aquino |
| Type | Article |
| Language | Italian |
| Date | 2017 |
| Journal | Dianoia |
| Volume | 24 |
| Pages | 15-32 |
| Categories | Aristotle, Commentary, De anima, Averroism, Siger of Brabant, Thomas |
| Author(s) | Federico Minzoni |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| A widespread historiographic commonplace, established by Thomas Aquinas himself in his Tractatus de unitate intellectus (1270), takes Siger of Brabant’s Quaestiones in tertium de anima (ca. 1265) to be a latin formulation of Ibn Rušd’s theory of the unity of the material intellect as exposed in the Tafsīr Kitāb al-Nafs (Long Commentary on the De anima, ca. 1186); according to the same view, Aquinas’ philosophy of mind would be the expression of a strongly antiaverroistic – and therefore more orthodox – kind of aristotelianism. Building on a thorough analysis of key texts in Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences (1255), I argue in this paper that those who hold Aquinas’ noetic to be anti-averroistic are greatly mistaken: while Siger’s always superficial rushdian inspiration is better understood against the background of a neoplatonic-tinged mind-body dualism clearly at odds with Ibn Rušd’s own strictly peripatetic ontology, Aquinas’ psychology, hylomorfic and not-dualist at its core, is aristotelian mainly inasmuch as it is rushdian. |
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| Title | Pomponazzi Contra Averroes on the Intellect |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2016 |
| Journal | British Journal for the History of Philosophy |
| Volume | 24 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 45–66 |
| Categories | Renaissance, De anima, Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Thomas |
| Author(s) | John Sellars |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| This paper examines Pomponazzi's arguments against Averroes in his De Immortalitate Animae, focusing on the question whether thought is possible without a body. The first part of the paper will sketch the history of the problem, namely the interpretation of Aristotle's remarks about the intellect in De Anima 3.4-5, touching on Alexander, Themistius, and Averroes. The second part will focus on Pomponazzi's response to Averroes, including his use of arguments by Aquinas. It will conclude by suggesting that Pomponazzi's discussion stands as the first properly modern account of Aristotle's psychology. |
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| Title | The Will in Averroes and Aquinas |
| Type | Article |
| Language | English |
| Date | 2013 |
| Journal | Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association |
| Volume | 87 |
| Pages | 231-247 |
| Categories | Thomas, Aristotle, De anima |
| Author(s) | Traci Phillipson |
| Publisher(s) | |
| Translator(s) |
| Despite the drastic differences in their views of the intellect and the location and specific function of the will both Aquinas and Averroes are able to claim that their systems allow for moral agency because they both place the will—a faculty that is of prime importance to the process of moral action—in the individual. Both philosophers think that they are following Aristotle in making their claims about the will and the intellects. This paper will examine the issue of will and the related issue of the intellects as it appears in the Aristotelian texts and in the subsequent work of Averroes and Aquinas. It will argue that at least some of the divergence in Averroes and Aquinas can be attributed to an issue of translation regarding De Anima, and a difference in the role of cogitation and the intellects regarding will. |
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