Pomponazzi Contra Averroes on the Intellect, 2016
By: John Sellars
Title Pomponazzi Contra Averroes on the Intellect
Type Article
Language English
Date 2016
Journal British Journal for the History of Philosophy
Volume 24
Issue 1
Pages 45–66
Categories Renaissance, De anima, Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Thomas
Author(s) John Sellars
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
This paper examines Pomponazzi's arguments against Averroes in his De Immortalitate Animae, focusing on the question whether thought is possible without a body. The first part of the paper will sketch the history of the problem, namely the interpretation of Aristotle's remarks about the intellect in De Anima 3.4-5, touching on Alexander, Themistius, and Averroes. The second part will focus on Pomponazzi's response to Averroes, including his use of arguments by Aquinas. It will conclude by suggesting that Pomponazzi's discussion stands as the first properly modern account of Aristotle's psychology.

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Ibn Rušd on the Structure of Aristotle's Metaphysics, 2010
By: Rüdiger Arnzen
Title Ibn Rušd on the Structure of Aristotle's Metaphysics
Type Article
Language English
Date 2010
Journal Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale
Volume 21
Pages 375–410
Categories Metaphysics, Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias
Author(s) Rüdiger Arnzen
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
The structure of Aristotle's Metaphysics was a matter of dispute among ancient and Medieval Greek, Arabic, and Latin-writing commentators. The present article investigates the question in which way the Arab philosopher Averroes dealt with this problem in his so-called Epitome and his literal commentary on the Metaphysics. It tries to show that in the Epitome Averroes restructured the contents of the Metaphysics according to his own conception of this discipline, and that this conception was partly indebted to his own main sources, al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, partly independent from these. Furthemore, the article examines whether and, if so, in which whay Averroes changed his mind about metaphysics as such and/or the structure of Aristotle's Metaphysics in his late literal commentary. It is argued that Averroes discarded there some of his earlier Avicennian positions in favour of a certain rapprochement to positions held by Alexander of Aphrodisias, but never gave up in general his overall conception of the Metaphysics as displayed in the Epitome.

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Ibn Rušd et les Premiers Analytiques d'Aristote. Aperçu sur un problème de syllogistique modale, 1995
By: Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal
Title Ibn Rušd et les Premiers Analytiques d'Aristote. Aperçu sur un problème de syllogistique modale
Type Article
Language French
Date 1995
Journal Arabic Sciences and Philosophy
Volume 5
Pages 51–74
Categories Logic, Alexander of Aphrodisias, al-Fārābī, Aristotle, Commentary
Author(s) Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
Ibn Rušd devoted a certain number of works to Aristotle's Prior Analytics. In a series of opuscules written over a period of twenty years and following upon his Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics, he faced a problem particular to the modal syllogism - that of the mood of the conclusion in mixed syllogisms. The problem can be stated as follows: At the beginning of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle established a formal deductive principle - that of universal attribution (Pr. An. I.1.24b26–30). Applied to the modal syllogism, this principle is inadequate as stated. It is too general to be applied in a univocal manner in all modal syllogisms. To preserve a sense of coherence in Aristotle's declarations, the commentators had to interpret it. Presenting the interpretations of the commentators, primarily al-Fārābī and Alexander, on the basis of al-Fārābī's Large Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics, Averroes criticizes them. Applied according to Alexander's interpretation, the principle of universal attribution is valid only for modal syllogisms one of whose premises is necessary and the other assertoric; according to al-Fārābī's interpretation, it is verified only when the minor premise is possible. Averroes proposes two preliminary solutions. Either this formal deductive principle must be applied differently according to the modal differences of the minor premises in mixed syllogisms (first solution) or would be used in two ways, generally or in keeping with each mood (second solution). These solutions are not satisfactory, for they call into question the unity and universality of the principle of universal attribution as established by Aristotle. What is the utility, Averroes asks, of a principle which does not hold for all modalities or does not apply to all the premises when the Prior Analytics ought to furnish formal and universal principles of deduction? And why did Aristotle define the principle of universal attribution without distinguishing its application according to each of the three modal premises? Returning at the end of his career to a literal exegesis of Aristotle's propositions and without harkening back to the earlier solutions, he proposes a theory of making the terms modal (fourth solution) in order to save Aristotle's declarations with respect to the principle of universal attribution and the mood of the conclusion of mixed syllogisms (Prior Analytics I. 9.30al5–20). Though formally inadequate, this solution, which had a continued history, proposes a new way of looking at the classification of modal propositions.

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Ibn Rušd et les Premiers Analytiques d'Aristote. Aperçu sur un problème de syllogistique modale, 1995
By: Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal
Title Ibn Rušd et les Premiers Analytiques d'Aristote. Aperçu sur un problème de syllogistique modale
Type Article
Language French
Date 1995
Journal Arabic Sciences and Philosophy
Volume 5
Pages 51–74
Categories Logic, Alexander of Aphrodisias, al-Fārābī, Aristotle, Commentary
Author(s) Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
Ibn Rušd devoted a certain number of works to Aristotle's Prior Analytics. In a series of opuscules written over a period of twenty years and following upon his Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics, he faced a problem particular to the modal syllogism - that of the mood of the conclusion in mixed syllogisms. The problem can be stated as follows: At the beginning of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle established a formal deductive principle - that of universal attribution (Pr. An. I.1.24b26–30). Applied to the modal syllogism, this principle is inadequate as stated. It is too general to be applied in a univocal manner in all modal syllogisms. To preserve a sense of coherence in Aristotle's declarations, the commentators had to interpret it. Presenting the interpretations of the commentators, primarily al-Fārābī and Alexander, on the basis of al-Fārābī's Large Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics, Averroes criticizes them. Applied according to Alexander's interpretation, the principle of universal attribution is valid only for modal syllogisms one of whose premises is necessary and the other assertoric; according to al-Fārābī's interpretation, it is verified only when the minor premise is possible. Averroes proposes two preliminary solutions. Either this formal deductive principle must be applied differently according to the modal differences of the minor premises in mixed syllogisms (first solution) or would be used in two ways, generally or in keeping with each mood (second solution). These solutions are not satisfactory, for they call into question the unity and universality of the principle of universal attribution as established by Aristotle. What is the utility, Averroes asks, of a principle which does not hold for all modalities or does not apply to all the premises when the Prior Analytics ought to furnish formal and universal principles of deduction? And why did Aristotle define the principle of universal attribution without distinguishing its application according to each of the three modal premises? Returning at the end of his career to a literal exegesis of Aristotle's propositions and without harkening back to the earlier solutions, he proposes a theory of making the terms modal (fourth solution) in order to save Aristotle's declarations with respect to the principle of universal attribution and the mood of the conclusion of mixed syllogisms (Prior Analytics I. 9.30al5–20). Though formally inadequate, this solution, which had a continued history, proposes a new way of looking at the classification of modal propositions.

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Ibn Rušd on the Structure of Aristotle's Metaphysics, 2010
By: Rüdiger Arnzen
Title Ibn Rušd on the Structure of Aristotle's Metaphysics
Type Article
Language English
Date 2010
Journal Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale
Volume 21
Pages 375–410
Categories Metaphysics, Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias
Author(s) Rüdiger Arnzen
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
The structure of Aristotle's Metaphysics was a matter of dispute among ancient and Medieval Greek, Arabic, and Latin-writing commentators. The present article investigates the question in which way the Arab philosopher Averroes dealt with this problem in his so-called Epitome and his literal commentary on the Metaphysics. It tries to show that in the Epitome Averroes restructured the contents of the Metaphysics according to his own conception of this discipline, and that this conception was partly indebted to his own main sources, al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, partly independent from these. Furthemore, the article examines whether and, if so, in which whay Averroes changed his mind about metaphysics as such and/or the structure of Aristotle's Metaphysics in his late literal commentary. It is argued that Averroes discarded there some of his earlier Avicennian positions in favour of a certain rapprochement to positions held by Alexander of Aphrodisias, but never gave up in general his overall conception of the Metaphysics as displayed in the Epitome.

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Pomponazzi Contra Averroes on the Intellect, 2016
By: John Sellars
Title Pomponazzi Contra Averroes on the Intellect
Type Article
Language English
Date 2016
Journal British Journal for the History of Philosophy
Volume 24
Issue 1
Pages 45–66
Categories Renaissance, De anima, Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Thomas
Author(s) John Sellars
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
This paper examines Pomponazzi's arguments against Averroes in his De Immortalitate Animae, focusing on the question whether thought is possible without a body. The first part of the paper will sketch the history of the problem, namely the interpretation of Aristotle's remarks about the intellect in De Anima 3.4-5, touching on Alexander, Themistius, and Averroes. The second part will focus on Pomponazzi's response to Averroes, including his use of arguments by Aquinas. It will conclude by suggesting that Pomponazzi's discussion stands as the first properly modern account of Aristotle's psychology.

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