{"_index":"bib","_type":"_doc","_id":"5277","_score":null,"_source":{"id":5277,"authors_free":[{"id":6093,"entry_id":5277,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":1760,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Therese Scarpelli Cory","free_first_name":"Therese Scarpelli","free_last_name":"Cory","norm_person":{"id":1760,"first_name":"Therese Scarpelli","last_name":"Cory","full_name":"Therese Scarpelli Cory","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"https:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1050852745","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null,"link":"bib?authors[]=Therese Scarpelli Cory"}}],"entry_title":"Averroes and Aquinas on the Agent Intellect\u2019s Causation of the Intelligible","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","main_title":{"title":"Averroes and Aquinas on the Agent Intellect\u2019s Causation of the Intelligible"},"abstract":"This article examines two medieval thinkers \u2013 Averroes and Aquinas \u2013 on the kind of causation exercised by the agent intellect in 'abstracting' or producing intelligibles from images in the imagination. It argues that abstraction in these thinkers should be interpreted in causal terms, as an act whereby images in the imagination, through the power of the agent intellect, educe their intelligible likeness in a receptive intellect. This Averroean-Thomistic causal approach to abstraction offers an intriguing alternative to the usual approach to abstraction as an epistemological content-sorting. The article also demonstrates the extensive common ground uniting these thinkers\u2019 cognition theories, despite Aquinas\u2019s well-known rejection of Averroes\u2019s theory of separate Intellects.","btype":3,"date":"2015","language":"English","online_url":"","doi_url":"","ti_url":"","categories":[{"id":51,"category_name":"Thomas","link":"bib?categories[]=Thomas"},{"id":12,"category_name":"Psychology","link":"bib?categories[]=Psychology"},{"id":31,"category_name":"Metaphysics","link":"bib?categories[]=Metaphysics"}],"authors":[{"id":1760,"full_name":"Therese Scarpelli Cory","role":1}],"works":[],"republication_of":null,"translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":5277,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Recherches de Th\u00e9ologie et Philosophie m\u00e9di\u00e9vales","volume":"82","issue":"1","pages":"1\u201360"}},"sort":["Averroes and Aquinas on the Agent Intellect\u2019s Causation of the Intelligible"]}

{"_index":"bib","_type":"_doc","_id":"5805","_score":null,"_source":{"id":5805,"authors_free":[{"id":6726,"entry_id":5805,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":1902,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Hamid Taieb","free_first_name":"Hamid ","free_last_name":"Taieb","norm_person":{"id":1902,"first_name":"Hamid ","last_name":"Taieb","full_name":"Hamid Taieb","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":null,"dnb_url":"https:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1077921705","viaf_url":"","db_url":"","from_claudius":null,"link":"bib?authors[]=Hamid Taieb"}}],"entry_title":"Does Each of Us Think Our Own Universal? An Averroean Challenge for (Aquinas and) Hervaeus Natalis","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","main_title":{"title":"Does Each of Us Think Our Own Universal? An Averroean Challenge for (Aquinas and) Hervaeus Natalis"},"abstract":"This paper aims to address a problem faced by any philosopher who treats universals as intentional objects: in defending this thesis, aren't they committed to the view that each of us thinks an individuated universal, since each of us, when thinking of a universal, must have our own intentional object? This problem, which is mentioned by Brentano at the turn of the twentieth century, originated in the Middle Ages in debates initiated by Averroes about the nature of the intellect. It shows up in the later Aquinas, due to his theory of the verbum, which might be interpreted as a sort of intentional object, but it is solved without too much difficulty. It is later found in Hervaeus Natalis, who does accept intentional objects; in contrast to Aquinas, it is not clear that Hervaeus has a good solution to the problem. After first presenting the problem, this paper then turns to its medieval origins by analyzing its occurrence in Aquinas's criticism of Averroes. It then explains why Hervaeus has more difficulties than Aquinas in solving the problem. It concludes with a systematic reflection on the various possible solutions to the problem.","btype":3,"date":"2022","language":"English","online_url":"","doi_url":"10.5406\/21521026.39.4.03","ti_url":"","categories":[{"id":31,"category_name":"Metaphysics","link":"bib?categories[]=Metaphysics"},{"id":12,"category_name":"Psychology","link":"bib?categories[]=Psychology"}],"authors":[{"id":1902,"full_name":"Hamid Taieb","role":1}],"works":[],"republication_of":null,"translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":5805,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":"39","issue":"4","pages":"339-354"}},"sort":["Does Each of Us Think Our Own Universal? An Averroean Challenge for (Aquinas and) Hervaeus Natalis"]}

{"_index":"bib","_type":"_doc","_id":"5336","_score":null,"_source":{"id":5336,"authors_free":[{"id":6182,"entry_id":5336,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":950,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Deborah L. Black","free_first_name":"Deborah L.","free_last_name":"Black","norm_person":{"id":950,"first_name":"Deborah Louise","last_name":"Black","full_name":"Deborah Louise Black","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":0,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1061153703","viaf_url":"https:\/\/viaf.org\/viaf\/12971847","db_url":"","from_claudius":1,"link":"bib?authors[]=Deborah Louise Black"}}],"entry_title":"Intentionality in Medieval Arabic Philosophy","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","main_title":{"title":"Intentionality in Medieval Arabic Philosophy"},"abstract":"It has long been a truism of the history of philosophy that intentionality is an invention of the medieval period, and within this standard narrative, the central place of Arabic philosophy has always been acknowledged. Yet there are many misconceptions surrounding the theories of intentionality advanced by the two main Arabic thinkers whose works were available to the West, Avicenna and Averroes. In the first part of this paper I offer an overview of the general accounts of intentionality and intentional being found in the linguistic, psychological, and metaphysical writings of Avicenna and Averroes, and I trace the terminology of \u201cintentions\u201d to a neglected passage from Avicenna\u2019s logic. In the second part of the paper I examine the way that Avicenna and Averroes apply their general theories of intentionality to the realm of sense perception. I offer an explanation of why Avicenna might have chosen to denominate the objects of the internal sense faculty of estimation as \u201cintentions\u201d, and I explore the implications of Averroes\u2019s decision to attribute intentionality to the external senses and the media of perception.","btype":3,"date":"2010","language":"English","online_url":"","doi_url":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1484\/J.QUAESTIO.1.102326","ti_url":"","categories":[{"id":10,"category_name":"Avicenna","link":"bib?categories[]=Avicenna"},{"id":12,"category_name":"Psychology","link":"bib?categories[]=Psychology"},{"id":31,"category_name":"Metaphysics","link":"bib?categories[]=Metaphysics"},{"id":78,"category_name":"Linguistics","link":"bib?categories[]=Linguistics"}],"authors":[{"id":950,"full_name":"Deborah Louise Black","role":1}],"works":[],"republication_of":null,"translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":5336,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Quaestio","volume":" 10","issue":"","pages":"65-81"}},"sort":["Intentionality in Medieval Arabic Philosophy"]}