Averroismi al plurale. La ricezione del Tafsîr kitâb al-nafs di Ibn Rushd nel Commento alle Sentenze di Tommaso d’Aquino, 2017
By: Federico Minzoni
Title Averroismi al plurale. La ricezione del Tafsîr kitâb al-nafs di Ibn Rushd nel Commento alle Sentenze di Tommaso d’Aquino
Type Article
Language Italian
Date 2017
Journal Dianoia
Volume 24
Pages 15-32
Categories Aristotle, Commentary, De anima, Averroism, Siger of Brabant, Thomas
Author(s) Federico Minzoni
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
A widespread historiographic commonplace, established by Thomas Aquinas himself in his Tractatus de unitate intellectus (1270), takes Siger of Brabant’s Quaestiones in tertium de anima (ca. 1265) to be a latin formulation of Ibn Rušd’s theory of the unity of the material intellect as exposed in the Tafsīr Kitāb al-Nafs (Long Commentary on the De anima, ca. 1186); according to the same view, Aquinas’ philosophy of mind would be the expression of a strongly antiaverroistic – and therefore more orthodox – kind of aristotelianism. Building on a thorough analysis of key texts in Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences (1255), I argue in this paper that those who hold Aquinas’ noetic to be anti-averroistic are greatly mistaken: while Siger’s always superficial rushdian inspiration is better understood against the background of a neoplatonic-tinged mind-body dualism clearly at odds with Ibn Rušd’s own strictly peripatetic ontology, Aquinas’ psychology, hylomorfic and not-dualist at its core, is aristotelian mainly inasmuch as it is rushdian.

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Pomponazzi Contra Averroes on the Intellect, 2016
By: John Sellars
Title Pomponazzi Contra Averroes on the Intellect
Type Article
Language English
Date 2016
Journal British Journal for the History of Philosophy
Volume 24
Issue 1
Pages 45–66
Categories Renaissance, De anima, Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Thomas
Author(s) John Sellars
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
This paper examines Pomponazzi's arguments against Averroes in his De Immortalitate Animae, focusing on the question whether thought is possible without a body. The first part of the paper will sketch the history of the problem, namely the interpretation of Aristotle's remarks about the intellect in De Anima 3.4-5, touching on Alexander, Themistius, and Averroes. The second part will focus on Pomponazzi's response to Averroes, including his use of arguments by Aquinas. It will conclude by suggesting that Pomponazzi's discussion stands as the first properly modern account of Aristotle's psychology.

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The Will in Averroes and Aquinas, 2013
By: Traci Phillipson
Title The Will in Averroes and Aquinas
Type Article
Language English
Date 2013
Journal Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
Volume 87
Pages 231-247
Categories Thomas, Aristotle, De anima
Author(s) Traci Phillipson
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
Despite the drastic differences in their views of the intellect and the location and specific function of the will both Aquinas and Averroes are able to claim that their systems allow for moral agency because they both place the will—a faculty that is of prime importance to the process of moral action—in the individual. Both philosophers think that they are following Aristotle in making their claims about the will and the intellects. This paper will examine the issue of will and the related issue of the intellects as it appears in the Aristotelian texts and in the subsequent work of Averroes and Aquinas. It will argue that at least some of the divergence in Averroes and Aquinas can be attributed to an issue of translation regarding De Anima, and a difference in the role of cogitation and the intellects regarding will.

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Long Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, 2012
By: Averroes, Y. Eshots (Ed.),
Title Long Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima
Type Article
Language undefined
Date 2012
Journal Ishraq. Islamic Philosophy Yearbook
Volume 3
Pages 380–407
Categories Commentary, Aristotle, De anima
Author(s) Averroes , Y. Eshots ,
Publisher(s)
Translator(s) N. V. Efremova

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Averroes’s Unity Argument Against Multiple Intellects
By: Stephen R. Ogden
Title Averroes’s Unity Argument Against Multiple Intellects
Type Article
Language English
Journal Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
Volume 103
Issue 3
Pages 429–454
Categories De anima, Aristotle
Author(s) Stephen R. Ogden
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
Averroes (Ibn Rushd) is well-known for his controversial thesis that there is only one separate intellect for all humankind. This article provides a detailed analysis of Averroes’s Unity Argument from his Long Commentary on De Anima, which argues from unified intelligible concepts to a single transcendent intellect. I set out the Unity Argument in its textual and philosophical context, explain exactly how the argument works on a new interpretation of its infinite regress (based on Averroes’s other assumptions about the mind-dependence of universals), and offer some brief suggestions as to how it might be further evaluated in light of alternative ancient and medieval theories. Ultimately, I demonstrate that the Unity Argument is Averroes’s most important philosophical argument for his distinctive view of intellect.

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Averroes’s Unity Argument Against Multiple Intellects
By: Stephen R. Ogden
Title Averroes’s Unity Argument Against Multiple Intellects
Type Article
Language English
Journal Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
Volume 103
Issue 3
Pages 429–454
Categories De anima, Aristotle
Author(s) Stephen R. Ogden
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
Averroes (Ibn Rushd) is well-known for his controversial thesis that there is only one separate intellect for all humankind. This article provides a detailed analysis of Averroes’s Unity Argument from his Long Commentary on De Anima, which argues from unified intelligible concepts to a single transcendent intellect. I set out the Unity Argument in its textual and philosophical context, explain exactly how the argument works on a new interpretation of its infinite regress (based on Averroes’s other assumptions about the mind-dependence of universals), and offer some brief suggestions as to how it might be further evaluated in light of alternative ancient and medieval theories. Ultimately, I demonstrate that the Unity Argument is Averroes’s most important philosophical argument for his distinctive view of intellect.

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Averroismi al plurale. La ricezione del Tafsîr kitâb al-nafs di Ibn Rushd nel Commento alle Sentenze di Tommaso d’Aquino, 2017
By: Federico Minzoni
Title Averroismi al plurale. La ricezione del Tafsîr kitâb al-nafs di Ibn Rushd nel Commento alle Sentenze di Tommaso d’Aquino
Type Article
Language Italian
Date 2017
Journal Dianoia
Volume 24
Pages 15-32
Categories Aristotle, Commentary, De anima, Averroism, Siger of Brabant, Thomas
Author(s) Federico Minzoni
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
A widespread historiographic commonplace, established by Thomas Aquinas himself in his Tractatus de unitate intellectus (1270), takes Siger of Brabant’s Quaestiones in tertium de anima (ca. 1265) to be a latin formulation of Ibn Rušd’s theory of the unity of the material intellect as exposed in the Tafsīr Kitāb al-Nafs (Long Commentary on the De anima, ca. 1186); according to the same view, Aquinas’ philosophy of mind would be the expression of a strongly antiaverroistic – and therefore more orthodox – kind of aristotelianism. Building on a thorough analysis of key texts in Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences (1255), I argue in this paper that those who hold Aquinas’ noetic to be anti-averroistic are greatly mistaken: while Siger’s always superficial rushdian inspiration is better understood against the background of a neoplatonic-tinged mind-body dualism clearly at odds with Ibn Rušd’s own strictly peripatetic ontology, Aquinas’ psychology, hylomorfic and not-dualist at its core, is aristotelian mainly inasmuch as it is rushdian.

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Long Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, 2012
By: Averroes, Y. Eshots (Ed.),
Title Long Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima
Type Article
Language undefined
Date 2012
Journal Ishraq. Islamic Philosophy Yearbook
Volume 3
Pages 380–407
Categories Commentary, Aristotle, De anima
Author(s) Averroes , Y. Eshots ,
Publisher(s)
Translator(s) N. V. Efremova

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Pomponazzi Contra Averroes on the Intellect, 2016
By: John Sellars
Title Pomponazzi Contra Averroes on the Intellect
Type Article
Language English
Date 2016
Journal British Journal for the History of Philosophy
Volume 24
Issue 1
Pages 45–66
Categories Renaissance, De anima, Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Thomas
Author(s) John Sellars
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
This paper examines Pomponazzi's arguments against Averroes in his De Immortalitate Animae, focusing on the question whether thought is possible without a body. The first part of the paper will sketch the history of the problem, namely the interpretation of Aristotle's remarks about the intellect in De Anima 3.4-5, touching on Alexander, Themistius, and Averroes. The second part will focus on Pomponazzi's response to Averroes, including his use of arguments by Aquinas. It will conclude by suggesting that Pomponazzi's discussion stands as the first properly modern account of Aristotle's psychology.

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The Will in Averroes and Aquinas, 2013
By: Traci Phillipson
Title The Will in Averroes and Aquinas
Type Article
Language English
Date 2013
Journal Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
Volume 87
Pages 231-247
Categories Thomas, Aristotle, De anima
Author(s) Traci Phillipson
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
Despite the drastic differences in their views of the intellect and the location and specific function of the will both Aquinas and Averroes are able to claim that their systems allow for moral agency because they both place the will—a faculty that is of prime importance to the process of moral action—in the individual. Both philosophers think that they are following Aristotle in making their claims about the will and the intellects. This paper will examine the issue of will and the related issue of the intellects as it appears in the Aristotelian texts and in the subsequent work of Averroes and Aquinas. It will argue that at least some of the divergence in Averroes and Aquinas can be attributed to an issue of translation regarding De Anima, and a difference in the role of cogitation and the intellects regarding will.

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