Sources et origines de la théorie de l’intellect d’Averroès (II), 2021
By: Marc Geoffroy
Title Sources et origines de la théorie de l’intellect d’Averroès (II)
Type Article
Language French
Date 2021
Journal Mélanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph
Volume 68
Pages 135–232
Categories Psychology, Tradition and Reception, Influence, De anima
Author(s) Marc Geoffroy
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
Cette contribution constitue la deuxième partie de la publication, avec quelques mises à jour et aménagements, d’une thèse de doctorat soutenue sous le même intitulé à l’École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris, en décembre 2009 et dont la première partie a été publiée dans les MUSJ 66 (2015-2016). L’auteur entend, selon une perspective strictement historique, déterminer les sources sur lesquelles s’est appuyé, entre les années cinquante et soixante du xiie siècle (première période de son travail philosophique), Averroès (Ibn Rušd, m. 1198) pour concevoir sa théorie de l’âme et de l’intellect, en référence aux sources péripatéticiennes auxquelles il pouvait avoir accès de son temps. Pour celui qui vaut dans la tradition philosophique comme le « Commentateur » d’Aristote par excellence, il peut paraître étonnant qu’Averroès n’ait eu d’emblée accès qu’à des sources indirectes relatives à la théorie de l’âme du Stagirite, mais ce fut pourtant le cas, comme l’auteur le montre ici. On voit en effet que la doctrine de l’âme exposée par Averroès est essentiellement structurée par l’enseignement d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise et par son De anima. L’aristotélisme d’Averroès apparaît de ce point de vue comme un aristotélisme sans Aristote, et ceci allait refluer de manière décisive sur l’exégèse d’Averroès une fois qu’il se serait emparé de l’écrit du Stagirite, notamment et surtout pour expliquer les chapitres 4 et 5 du livre III du De anima (sur l’intellect en puissance et l’intellect agent).

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La position de Zabarella vis-à-vis d’Averroès dans son Commentaire sur le De anima, 2021
By: Jules Janssens
Title La position de Zabarella vis-à-vis d’Averroès dans son Commentaire sur le De anima
Type Article
Language French
Date 2021
Journal Mélanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph
Volume 68
Pages 105–135
Categories Renaissance, Tradition and Reception, Commentary, De anima
Author(s) Jules Janssens
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
Dans son commentaire sur le De anima d’Aristote Zabarella fait un usage non négligeable du Grand Commentaire sur le même ouvrage d’Averroès, le grand penseur andalou. On a pris l’habitude de considérer que Zabarella n’a pas pu finaliser son commentaire, étant donné qu’il fut publié à titre posthume. Il s’agirait donc d’un ouvrage incomplet. Toutefois, si on tient compte du fait que Zabarella s’intéresse avant tout, voire presque exclusivement, à l’étude de l’âme humaine, tout indique qu’il a consciemment choisi de ne pas commenter certains chapitres de l’ouvrage du Stagirite. Quant à l’impact d’Averroès sur la doctrine de l’âme exposée par Zabarella, elle a été diversement évaluée dans la recherche contemporaine, mais dans l’ensemble on y perçoit une attitude fortement critique du dernier envers le premier. Il est nécessaire de nuancer ce jugement. En effet, sur la base de trois fragments, répartis sur les trois livres, la présente recherche met en lumière qu’Averroès est considéré par Zabarella comme une vraie autorité, « auctoritas » ; que Zabarella souscrit parfois pleinement à l’interprétation du maître arabe ; et, enfin, que Zabarella explique certaines explications « erronées » de ce dernier comme l’effet inévitable de la traduction fautive du texte aristotélicien dont Averroès disposait. En somme, l’attitude de Zabarella vis-à-vis d’Averroès s’avère complexe, évitant aussi bien l’excès d’un rejet total que celui d’une acceptation aveugle.

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Averroismi al plurale, II. La ricezione del Commento grande al De anima di Ibn Rushd nelle Quaestiones in tertium de anima di Sigieri di Brabante, 2019
By: Federico Minzoni
Title Averroismi al plurale, II. La ricezione del Commento grande al De anima di Ibn Rushd nelle Quaestiones in tertium de anima di Sigieri di Brabante
Type Article
Language Italian
Date 2019
Journal Dianoia
Volume 28
Pages 81–94
Categories Siger of Brabant, De anima
Author(s) Federico Minzoni
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
Siger of Brabant sketches in his Quaestiones in tertium de anima (ca. 1269) a noetic theory defending the unity of the intellect that is usually considered as a latin formulation of Ibn Rušd’s theory of the separateness of the material intellect as put forth in the Long Commentary on the De anima (ca. 1186). A closer look at key texts in both the Quaestiones and the Long Commentary will give us a quite different picture: while Siger works out his theory on the background of a dualistic anthropology that takes the union between the intellective soul (conceived as an hoc aliquid) and the human body to be only operational, Ibn Rušd (who develops his theory starting from strictly aristotelic epistemological premises) repeatedly stresses throughout the Long Commentary that, if man is an agent of thought, the union between the separate intellects and the thinking individual ought to be always hylomorphic. This paper aims at showing that, although Siger has often been identified as an averroist, his psychology is certainly not rushdian.

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Averroès et l'intellect matériel diaphane - Remarques sur une analogie variable, 2018
By: Jean-Baptiste Brenet
Title Averroès et l'intellect matériel diaphane - Remarques sur une analogie variable
Type Article
Language French
Date 2018
Journal Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales
Volume 85
Issue 2
Pages 261–284
Categories Commentary, De anima
Author(s) Jean-Baptiste Brenet
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
This paper studies the analogy set forth by Averroes in his Great Commentary on the De anima between the material intellect and the transparent medium. The overall context of the present inquiry is the 'question of Theophrastus' concerning the nature of the material intellect. The paper argues that the analogy between material intellect and transparent medium arises because, just like the transparent medium, the material intellect’s functioning requires a prior actualization: just as colors shine through the transparent medium only insofar as it is itself actually illuminated, the material intellect can receive intelligible forms only insofar as it is fundamentally actualized by the agent intellect. The aim of this paper is thus to reconsider the nature of the material intellect’s potency and its formal relation to the agent intellect.

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Averroismi al plurale. La ricezione del Tafsîr kitâb al-nafs di Ibn Rushd nel Commento alle Sentenze di Tommaso d’Aquino, 2017
By: Federico Minzoni
Title Averroismi al plurale. La ricezione del Tafsîr kitâb al-nafs di Ibn Rushd nel Commento alle Sentenze di Tommaso d’Aquino
Type Article
Language Italian
Date 2017
Journal Dianoia
Volume 24
Pages 15-32
Categories Aristotle, Commentary, De anima, Averroism, Siger of Brabant, Thomas
Author(s) Federico Minzoni
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
A widespread historiographic commonplace, established by Thomas Aquinas himself in his Tractatus de unitate intellectus (1270), takes Siger of Brabant’s Quaestiones in tertium de anima (ca. 1265) to be a latin formulation of Ibn Rušd’s theory of the unity of the material intellect as exposed in the Tafsīr Kitāb al-Nafs (Long Commentary on the De anima, ca. 1186); according to the same view, Aquinas’ philosophy of mind would be the expression of a strongly antiaverroistic – and therefore more orthodox – kind of aristotelianism. Building on a thorough analysis of key texts in Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences (1255), I argue in this paper that those who hold Aquinas’ noetic to be anti-averroistic are greatly mistaken: while Siger’s always superficial rushdian inspiration is better understood against the background of a neoplatonic-tinged mind-body dualism clearly at odds with Ibn Rušd’s own strictly peripatetic ontology, Aquinas’ psychology, hylomorfic and not-dualist at its core, is aristotelian mainly inasmuch as it is rushdian.

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’Active Intellect’ in Avempace and Averroës: An Interpretative Issue, 2016
By: Daniel Bučan
Title ’Active Intellect’ in Avempace and Averroës: An Interpretative Issue
Type Article
Language English
Date 2016
Journal Synthesis Philosophica
Volume 62
Issue 2
Pages 345–358
Categories Ibn Bāǧǧa, De anima, Psychology
Author(s) Daniel Bučan
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
This essay is about the understanding of the notion of active intellect in Ibn Bāǧǧa (Avempace) and Ibn Rushd (Averroës). The traditional interpretation of both Avempace’s and Averroës’ concept of active intellect is that they both understand it as the lowest celestial intelligence which is dator formarum, and that man thinks and cognizes intelligibles only by “connecting” with it in a quasi-mystic way; cognition being the active intellect’s granting ideas (formae or concepts) to man’s intellect. The author believes that both in Avempace’s and Averroës’ theory of cognition the notion of active intellect is only the highest function of human intellect, not a celestial entity. Based on such a presumption, as well as on the analysis of his theory, Avempace’s notion of iṭṭiṣāl bi-’aql fa’āl is interpreted not as a kind of mystic “conjunction” or “union” with a separate celestial entity, but as reaching the highest level of man’s intellect function in the continuity of the process of thinking. The same goes for Averroës’ theory, which is quite clearly presented in his Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect, where one can find practically direct confirmation for such an interpretation, because Averroës says that “conjunction with it seems to resemble more the conjunction of form in matter than it does the conjunction of agent with effect. The well-known difference between agent and effect is that the agent is external, but here there is no external agent”, or that active intellect “conjoins with us from the outset by conjunction of in-existence”. The author concludes that the issue of the active intellect in Islamic philosophy is not disambiguous – for different thinkers it was a different concept – only the function of the active intellect is always one and the same: producing ideas.

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On a Possible Argument for Averroes’s Single Separate Intellect, 2016
By: Stephen R. Ogden
Title On a Possible Argument for Averroes’s Single Separate Intellect
Type Article
Language English
Date 2016
Journal Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy
Volume 4
Pages 27–63
Categories De anima, Psychology
Author(s) Stephen R. Ogden
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)

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Pomponazzi Contra Averroes on the Intellect, 2016
By: John Sellars
Title Pomponazzi Contra Averroes on the Intellect
Type Article
Language English
Date 2016
Journal British Journal for the History of Philosophy
Volume 24
Issue 1
Pages 45–66
Categories Renaissance, De anima, Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Thomas
Author(s) John Sellars
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
This paper examines Pomponazzi's arguments against Averroes in his De Immortalitate Animae, focusing on the question whether thought is possible without a body. The first part of the paper will sketch the history of the problem, namely the interpretation of Aristotle's remarks about the intellect in De Anima 3.4-5, touching on Alexander, Themistius, and Averroes. The second part will focus on Pomponazzi's response to Averroes, including his use of arguments by Aquinas. It will conclude by suggesting that Pomponazzi's discussion stands as the first properly modern account of Aristotle's psychology.

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A Comparative Study of the Relationship between the Material and the Active Intellect from the Perspective of Averroes and Al-Farabi, 2015
By: Davoud Zandi
Title A Comparative Study of the Relationship between the Material and the Active Intellect from the Perspective of Averroes and Al-Farabi
Type Article
Language English
Date 2015
Journal Journal of Islamic Studies and Culture
Volume 3
Issue 2
Pages 39-41
Categories Psychology, De anima
Author(s) Davoud Zandi
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
The relationship between the material intellect and the active intellect is an important issue in the realm of epistemology in Islamic philosophy. The aim of the present study is to compare the views of Averroes and Al-Farabi in this regard. Reviewing their theories, this study shows that both the mentioned philosophers agree upon the fact that the Active Intellect exists apart from human soul and acts as a creator of forms, but as for the relationship between the Material Intellect and the Active Intellect, there is disagreement between Averroes and Al-Farabi. Averroes believes that in some aspects both of them are the same yet they are different in some other aspects, namely regarding their acts they are different because the active intellect acts as creator of forms while the material intellect is just receiver of the forms. Nevertheless, they are the same, since the material intellect achieves perfection through the active intellect, whereas in Al-Farabi’s opinion, ontologically speaking; the material intellect and the active intellect are different in their existence. The material intellect in al-Farabi’s perspective is one of the stages of human intellect that is inherent in human soul, whereas the active intellect is an immaterial substance that exists apart from human soul.

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Du corporel au spirituel. Averroès et la question d'un sens « agent », 2014
By: Jean-Baptiste Brenet
Title Du corporel au spirituel. Averroès et la question d'un sens « agent »
Type Article
Language French
Date 2014
Journal Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie
Volume 61
Issue 1
Pages 19–42
Categories De anima
Author(s) Jean-Baptiste Brenet
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)

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A Comparative Study of the Relationship between the Material and the Active Intellect from the Perspective of Averroes and Al-Farabi, 2015
By: Davoud Zandi
Title A Comparative Study of the Relationship between the Material and the Active Intellect from the Perspective of Averroes and Al-Farabi
Type Article
Language English
Date 2015
Journal Journal of Islamic Studies and Culture
Volume 3
Issue 2
Pages 39-41
Categories Psychology, De anima
Author(s) Davoud Zandi
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
The relationship between the material intellect and the active intellect is an important issue in the realm of epistemology in Islamic philosophy. The aim of the present study is to compare the views of Averroes and Al-Farabi in this regard. Reviewing their theories, this study shows that both the mentioned philosophers agree upon the fact that the Active Intellect exists apart from human soul and acts as a creator of forms, but as for the relationship between the Material Intellect and the Active Intellect, there is disagreement between Averroes and Al-Farabi. Averroes believes that in some aspects both of them are the same yet they are different in some other aspects, namely regarding their acts they are different because the active intellect acts as creator of forms while the material intellect is just receiver of the forms. Nevertheless, they are the same, since the material intellect achieves perfection through the active intellect, whereas in Al-Farabi’s opinion, ontologically speaking; the material intellect and the active intellect are different in their existence. The material intellect in al-Farabi’s perspective is one of the stages of human intellect that is inherent in human soul, whereas the active intellect is an immaterial substance that exists apart from human soul.

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As it is, it is an Ax. Some Medieval Reflections on De anima II.1, 1997
By: Mary Sirridge
Title As it is, it is an Ax. Some Medieval Reflections on De anima II.1
Type Article
Language English
Date 1997
Journal Medieval Philosophy and Theology
Volume 6
Issue 1
Pages 1–24
Categories Psychology, De anima
Author(s) Mary Sirridge
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)

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Averroes' Middle and Long Commentaries on the De Anima, 1995
By: Alfred L. Ivry
Title Averroes' Middle and Long Commentaries on the De Anima
Type Article
Language English
Date 1995
Journal Arabic Sciences and Philosophy
Volume 5
Pages 75–92
Categories Psychology, De anima
Author(s) Alfred L. Ivry
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
This article claims that Averroes wrote his Middle Commentary on the De anima after he composed both his Short and Long commentaries. A close comparison of the two texts proves that he had the Long commentary before him when composing the Middle. This has implications both for the development of Averroes' doctrine of the intellect, and for understanding Averroes' style of composing commentaries.

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Averroes' Short Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, 1997
By: Alfred L. Ivry
Title Averroes' Short Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima
Type Article
Language English
Date 1997
Journal Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale
Volume 8
Pages 511–549
Categories Psychology, De anima
Author(s) Alfred L. Ivry
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)

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Averroes, sobre las facultades locomotriz y desiderativa en al Taljîs del De Anima, 2008
By: Carmen Makki, Carmen Makki, Andrés Martínez Lorca
Title Averroes, sobre las facultades locomotriz y desiderativa en al Taljîs del De Anima
Type Article
Language Spanish
Date 2008
Journal La Ciudad de Dios
Volume 221
Issue 1
Pages 201–221
Categories Psychology, De anima
Author(s) Carmen Makki , Carmen Makki , Andrés Martínez Lorca
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)

{"_index":"bib","_type":"_doc","_id":"1430","_score":null,"_source":{"id":1430,"authors_free":[{"id":1625,"entry_id":1430,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":1338,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Carmen Makki","free_first_name":"Carmen","free_last_name":"Makki","norm_person":{"id":1338,"first_name":"Carmen","last_name":"Makki","full_name":"Carmen Makki","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":0,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"http:\/\/viaf.org\/viaf\/306463989","db_url":"","from_claudius":1,"link":"bib?authors[]=Carmen Makki"}},{"id":1626,"entry_id":1430,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":1338,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Carmen Makki","free_first_name":"Carmen","free_last_name":"Makki","norm_person":{"id":1338,"first_name":"Carmen","last_name":"Makki","full_name":"Carmen Makki","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":0,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"http:\/\/viaf.org\/viaf\/306463989","db_url":"","from_claudius":1,"link":"bib?authors[]=Carmen Makki"}},{"id":1627,"entry_id":1430,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":756,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Andr\u00e9s Mart\u00ednez Lorca","free_first_name":"Andr\u00e9s","free_last_name":"Mart\u00ednez Lorca","norm_person":{"id":756,"first_name":"Andr\u00e9s","last_name":"Mart\u00ednez Lorca","full_name":"Andr\u00e9s Mart\u00ednez Lorca","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":0,"dnb_url":"http:\/\/d-nb.info\/gnd\/1047955687","viaf_url":"https:\/\/viaf.org\/viaf\/51730671","db_url":"","from_claudius":1,"link":"bib?authors[]=Andr\u00e9s Mart\u00ednez Lorca"}}],"entry_title":"Averroes, sobre las facultades locomotriz y desiderativa en al Talj\u00ees del De Anima","title_transcript":null,"title_translation":null,"main_title":{"title":"Averroes, sobre las facultades locomotriz y desiderativa en al Talj\u00ees del De Anima"},"abstract":null,"btype":3,"date":"2008","language":"Spanish","online_url":null,"doi_url":null,"ti_url":null,"categories":[{"id":12,"category_name":"Psychology","link":"bib?categories[]=Psychology"},{"id":46,"category_name":"De anima","link":"bib?categories[]=De anima"}],"authors":[{"id":1338,"full_name":"Carmen Makki","role":1},{"id":1338,"full_name":"Carmen Makki","role":1},{"id":756,"full_name":"Andr\u00e9s Mart\u00ednez Lorca","role":1}],"works":[],"republication_of":null,"translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":1430,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"La Ciudad de Dios","volume":"221","issue":"1","pages":"201\u2013221"}},"sort":["Averroes, sobre las facultades locomotriz y desiderativa en al Talj\u00ees del De Anima"]}

Averroes’s Unity Argument Against Multiple Intellects
By: Stephen R. Ogden
Title Averroes’s Unity Argument Against Multiple Intellects
Type Article
Language English
Journal Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
Volume 103
Issue 3
Pages 429–454
Categories De anima, Aristotle
Author(s) Stephen R. Ogden
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
Averroes (Ibn Rushd) is well-known for his controversial thesis that there is only one separate intellect for all humankind. This article provides a detailed analysis of Averroes’s Unity Argument from his Long Commentary on De Anima, which argues from unified intelligible concepts to a single transcendent intellect. I set out the Unity Argument in its textual and philosophical context, explain exactly how the argument works on a new interpretation of its infinite regress (based on Averroes’s other assumptions about the mind-dependence of universals), and offer some brief suggestions as to how it might be further evaluated in light of alternative ancient and medieval theories. Ultimately, I demonstrate that the Unity Argument is Averroes’s most important philosophical argument for his distinctive view of intellect.

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Averroismi al plurale, II. La ricezione del Commento grande al De anima di Ibn Rushd nelle Quaestiones in tertium de anima di Sigieri di Brabante, 2019
By: Federico Minzoni
Title Averroismi al plurale, II. La ricezione del Commento grande al De anima di Ibn Rushd nelle Quaestiones in tertium de anima di Sigieri di Brabante
Type Article
Language Italian
Date 2019
Journal Dianoia
Volume 28
Pages 81–94
Categories Siger of Brabant, De anima
Author(s) Federico Minzoni
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
Siger of Brabant sketches in his Quaestiones in tertium de anima (ca. 1269) a noetic theory defending the unity of the intellect that is usually considered as a latin formulation of Ibn Rušd’s theory of the separateness of the material intellect as put forth in the Long Commentary on the De anima (ca. 1186). A closer look at key texts in both the Quaestiones and the Long Commentary will give us a quite different picture: while Siger works out his theory on the background of a dualistic anthropology that takes the union between the intellective soul (conceived as an hoc aliquid) and the human body to be only operational, Ibn Rušd (who develops his theory starting from strictly aristotelic epistemological premises) repeatedly stresses throughout the Long Commentary that, if man is an agent of thought, the union between the separate intellects and the thinking individual ought to be always hylomorphic. This paper aims at showing that, although Siger has often been identified as an averroist, his psychology is certainly not rushdian.

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Averroismi al plurale. La ricezione del Tafsîr kitâb al-nafs di Ibn Rushd nel Commento alle Sentenze di Tommaso d’Aquino, 2017
By: Federico Minzoni
Title Averroismi al plurale. La ricezione del Tafsîr kitâb al-nafs di Ibn Rushd nel Commento alle Sentenze di Tommaso d’Aquino
Type Article
Language Italian
Date 2017
Journal Dianoia
Volume 24
Pages 15-32
Categories Aristotle, Commentary, De anima, Averroism, Siger of Brabant, Thomas
Author(s) Federico Minzoni
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
A widespread historiographic commonplace, established by Thomas Aquinas himself in his Tractatus de unitate intellectus (1270), takes Siger of Brabant’s Quaestiones in tertium de anima (ca. 1265) to be a latin formulation of Ibn Rušd’s theory of the unity of the material intellect as exposed in the Tafsīr Kitāb al-Nafs (Long Commentary on the De anima, ca. 1186); according to the same view, Aquinas’ philosophy of mind would be the expression of a strongly antiaverroistic – and therefore more orthodox – kind of aristotelianism. Building on a thorough analysis of key texts in Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences (1255), I argue in this paper that those who hold Aquinas’ noetic to be anti-averroistic are greatly mistaken: while Siger’s always superficial rushdian inspiration is better understood against the background of a neoplatonic-tinged mind-body dualism clearly at odds with Ibn Rušd’s own strictly peripatetic ontology, Aquinas’ psychology, hylomorfic and not-dualist at its core, is aristotelian mainly inasmuch as it is rushdian.

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Averroès et l'intellect matériel diaphane - Remarques sur une analogie variable, 2018
By: Jean-Baptiste Brenet
Title Averroès et l'intellect matériel diaphane - Remarques sur une analogie variable
Type Article
Language French
Date 2018
Journal Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales
Volume 85
Issue 2
Pages 261–284
Categories Commentary, De anima
Author(s) Jean-Baptiste Brenet
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
This paper studies the analogy set forth by Averroes in his Great Commentary on the De anima between the material intellect and the transparent medium. The overall context of the present inquiry is the 'question of Theophrastus' concerning the nature of the material intellect. The paper argues that the analogy between material intellect and transparent medium arises because, just like the transparent medium, the material intellect’s functioning requires a prior actualization: just as colors shine through the transparent medium only insofar as it is itself actually illuminated, the material intellect can receive intelligible forms only insofar as it is fundamentally actualized by the agent intellect. The aim of this paper is thus to reconsider the nature of the material intellect’s potency and its formal relation to the agent intellect.

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Commentarium magistri Johannis Wenceslai De Praga super 'De Anima' Aristotelis, 1982
By: Milan Mráz
Title Commentarium magistri Johannis Wenceslai De Praga super 'De Anima' Aristotelis
Type Article
Language Polish
Date 1982
Journal Mediaevalia philosophica Polonorum
Volume 26
Pages 79–91
Categories Psychology, De anima
Author(s) Milan Mráz
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)

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