’Active Intellect’ in Avempace and Averroës: An Interpretative Issue, 2016
By: Daniel Bučan
Title ’Active Intellect’ in Avempace and Averroës: An Interpretative Issue
Type Article
Language English
Date 2016
Journal Synthesis Philosophica
Volume 62
Issue 2
Pages 345–358
Categories Ibn Bāǧǧa, De anima, Psychology
Author(s) Daniel Bučan
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
This essay is about the understanding of the notion of active intellect in Ibn Bāǧǧa (Avempace) and Ibn Rushd (Averroës). The traditional interpretation of both Avempace’s and Averroës’ concept of active intellect is that they both understand it as the lowest celestial intelligence which is dator formarum, and that man thinks and cognizes intelligibles only by “connecting” with it in a quasi-mystic way; cognition being the active intellect’s granting ideas (formae or concepts) to man’s intellect. The author believes that both in Avempace’s and Averroës’ theory of cognition the notion of active intellect is only the highest function of human intellect, not a celestial entity. Based on such a presumption, as well as on the analysis of his theory, Avempace’s notion of iṭṭiṣāl bi-’aql fa’āl is interpreted not as a kind of mystic “conjunction” or “union” with a separate celestial entity, but as reaching the highest level of man’s intellect function in the continuity of the process of thinking. The same goes for Averroës’ theory, which is quite clearly presented in his Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect, where one can find practically direct confirmation for such an interpretation, because Averroës says that “conjunction with it seems to resemble more the conjunction of form in matter than it does the conjunction of agent with effect. The well-known difference between agent and effect is that the agent is external, but here there is no external agent”, or that active intellect “conjoins with us from the outset by conjunction of in-existence”. The author concludes that the issue of the active intellect in Islamic philosophy is not disambiguous – for different thinkers it was a different concept – only the function of the active intellect is always one and the same: producing ideas.

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L’éternité du mouvement chez Ibn Bâjja (Avempace) : de la définition générique à la défintion numérique. Le commentaire aux chapitres 1 et 2 du livre VIII de la Physique, 2016
By: Farah Cherif Zahar
Title L’éternité du mouvement chez Ibn Bâjja (Avempace) : de la définition générique à la défintion numérique. Le commentaire aux chapitres 1 et 2 du livre VIII de la Physique
Type Article
Language French
Date 2016
Journal Les Études Philosophiques
Volume 117
Issue 2
Pages 161–216
Categories Aristotle, Physics, al-Fārābī, Ibn Bāǧǧa, Influence
Author(s) Farah Cherif Zahar
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
This article examines Ibn Bāǧǧa’s (Avempace) interpretation of the first two chapters of the eighth book of Aristotle’s Physics and what he has in mind when he describes Aristotle’s proof as a demonstration of the eternity of motion “in genus.” His approach in the second appendix to book eight differs from the one he develops in the main commentary. In the former text, Ibn Bāǧǧa works on the distinction between essential and accidental successions, which leads him to realize that the accidental and thus possible successions— horizontal approach—are not sufficient to guarantee the eternity of movement and then to adopt a vertical approach that goes back to the numerical identity of the circular continuous motion. We show to what extent Ibn Bāǧǧa’s interpretation is indebted to Al-Fārābī’s lost treatise On Changing Beings and also aim to highlight the role of this reading in the evolution of Averroes’ interpretation.

{"_index":"bib","_type":"_doc","_id":"5260","_score":null,"_source":{"id":5260,"authors_free":[{"id":6069,"entry_id":5260,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Farah Cherif Zahar","free_first_name":"Farah","free_last_name":"Cherif Zahar","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"L\u2019\u00e9ternit\u00e9 du mouvement chez Ibn B\u00e2jja (Avempace) : de la d\u00e9finition g\u00e9n\u00e9rique \u00e0 la d\u00e9fintion num\u00e9rique. Le commentaire aux chapitres 1 et 2 du livre VIII de la Physique","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","main_title":{"title":"L\u2019\u00e9ternit\u00e9 du mouvement chez Ibn B\u00e2jja (Avempace) : de la d\u00e9finition g\u00e9n\u00e9rique \u00e0 la d\u00e9fintion num\u00e9rique. Le commentaire aux chapitres 1 et 2 du livre VIII de la Physique"},"abstract":"This article examines Ibn B\u0101\u01e7\u01e7a\u2019s (Avempace) interpretation of the first two chapters of the eighth book of Aristotle\u2019s Physics and what he has in mind when he describes Aristotle\u2019s proof as a demonstration of the eternity of motion \u201cin genus.\u201d His approach in the second appendix to book eight differs from the one he develops in the main commentary. In the former text, Ibn B\u0101\u01e7\u01e7a works on the distinction between essential and accidental successions, which leads him to realize that the accidental and thus possible successions\u2014 horizontal approach\u2014are not sufficient to guarantee the eternity of movement and then to adopt a vertical approach that goes back to the numerical identity of the circular continuous motion. We show to what extent Ibn B\u0101\u01e7\u01e7a\u2019s interpretation is indebted to Al-F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b\u2019s lost treatise On Changing Beings and also aim to highlight the role of this reading in the evolution of Averroes\u2019 interpretation. ","btype":3,"date":"2016","language":"French","online_url":"","doi_url":"","ti_url":"","categories":[{"id":21,"category_name":"Aristotle","link":"bib?categories[]=Aristotle"},{"id":37,"category_name":"Physics","link":"bib?categories[]=Physics"},{"id":28,"category_name":"al-F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b","link":"bib?categories[]=al-F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b"},{"id":17,"category_name":"Ibn B\u0101\u01e7\u01e7a","link":"bib?categories[]=Ibn B\u0101\u01e7\u01e7a"},{"id":24,"category_name":"Influence","link":"bib?categories[]=Influence"}],"authors":[],"works":[],"republication_of":null,"translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":5260,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes Philosophiques","volume":"117","issue":"2","pages":"161\u2013216"}},"sort":[2016]}

Albert the Great between Avempace and Averroes on the Knowledge of Separate Forms, 2012
By: Luis Xavier López-Farjeat
Title Albert the Great between Avempace and Averroes on the Knowledge of Separate Forms
Type Article
Language English
Date 2012
Journal Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
Volume 86
Issue 2
Pages 89–102
Categories Ibn Bāǧǧa, Aquinas, Albert
Author(s) Luis Xavier López-Farjeat
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
In Albert’s De anima III, 3, chapters 6–11 there is a discussion on whether the human intellect is able to apprehend only forms abstracted from matter or whether it is possible for it to know something separated from magnitude. If the human intellect is able to understand separate forms, this would mean that some forms are not apprehended with phantasms and magnitude but by the conjunction of the possible intellect and the separate intellect. This matter is quite problematic since it is not clear enough whether separate forms are known through the perfect conjunction of the possible intellect and the agent intellect or by means of the agent intellect which acts both as efficient and formal cause of these forms. Here, I focus on chapter 8 where Albert criticizes Avempace’s doctrine of the intellect, and chapter 11 where he states a resolution to the problem, which is very close to that of Averroes. This exploration illustrates the complexity of the relationship between the philosophies of Albert and Averroes.

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Arabic/Islamic Philosophy in Thomas Aquinas’s Conception of the Beatific Vision in IV Sent., D. 49, Q. 2, A.1, 2012
By: Richard C. Taylor
Title Arabic/Islamic Philosophy in Thomas Aquinas’s Conception of the Beatific Vision in IV Sent., D. 49, Q. 2, A.1
Type Article
Language English
Date 2012
Journal The Thomist
Volume 76
Issue 4
Pages 509–550
Categories Metaphysics, al-Fārābī, Ibn Bāǧǧa, Avicenna, Alexander of Aphrodisias
Author(s) Richard C. Taylor
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)

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Albert the Great between Avempace and Averroes on the Knowledge of Separate Forms, 2012
By: Luis Xavier López-Farjeat
Title Albert the Great between Avempace and Averroes on the Knowledge of Separate Forms
Type Article
Language English
Date 2012
Journal Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
Volume 86
Issue 2
Pages 89–102
Categories Ibn Bāǧǧa, Aquinas, Albert
Author(s) Luis Xavier López-Farjeat
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
In Albert’s De anima III, 3, chapters 6–11 there is a discussion on whether the human intellect is able to apprehend only forms abstracted from matter or whether it is possible for it to know something separated from magnitude. If the human intellect is able to understand separate forms, this would mean that some forms are not apprehended with phantasms and magnitude but by the conjunction of the possible intellect and the separate intellect. This matter is quite problematic since it is not clear enough whether separate forms are known through the perfect conjunction of the possible intellect and the agent intellect or by means of the agent intellect which acts both as efficient and formal cause of these forms. Here, I focus on chapter 8 where Albert criticizes Avempace’s doctrine of the intellect, and chapter 11 where he states a resolution to the problem, which is very close to that of Averroes. This exploration illustrates the complexity of the relationship between the philosophies of Albert and Averroes.

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Arabic/Islamic Philosophy in Thomas Aquinas’s Conception of the Beatific Vision in IV Sent., D. 49, Q. 2, A.1, 2012
By: Richard C. Taylor
Title Arabic/Islamic Philosophy in Thomas Aquinas’s Conception of the Beatific Vision in IV Sent., D. 49, Q. 2, A.1
Type Article
Language English
Date 2012
Journal The Thomist
Volume 76
Issue 4
Pages 509–550
Categories Metaphysics, al-Fārābī, Ibn Bāǧǧa, Avicenna, Alexander of Aphrodisias
Author(s) Richard C. Taylor
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)

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L’éternité du mouvement chez Ibn Bâjja (Avempace) : de la définition générique à la défintion numérique. Le commentaire aux chapitres 1 et 2 du livre VIII de la Physique, 2016
By: Farah Cherif Zahar
Title L’éternité du mouvement chez Ibn Bâjja (Avempace) : de la définition générique à la défintion numérique. Le commentaire aux chapitres 1 et 2 du livre VIII de la Physique
Type Article
Language French
Date 2016
Journal Les Études Philosophiques
Volume 117
Issue 2
Pages 161–216
Categories Aristotle, Physics, al-Fārābī, Ibn Bāǧǧa, Influence
Author(s) Farah Cherif Zahar
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
This article examines Ibn Bāǧǧa’s (Avempace) interpretation of the first two chapters of the eighth book of Aristotle’s Physics and what he has in mind when he describes Aristotle’s proof as a demonstration of the eternity of motion “in genus.” His approach in the second appendix to book eight differs from the one he develops in the main commentary. In the former text, Ibn Bāǧǧa works on the distinction between essential and accidental successions, which leads him to realize that the accidental and thus possible successions— horizontal approach—are not sufficient to guarantee the eternity of movement and then to adopt a vertical approach that goes back to the numerical identity of the circular continuous motion. We show to what extent Ibn Bāǧǧa’s interpretation is indebted to Al-Fārābī’s lost treatise On Changing Beings and also aim to highlight the role of this reading in the evolution of Averroes’ interpretation.

{"_index":"bib","_type":"_doc","_id":"5260","_score":null,"_source":{"id":5260,"authors_free":[{"id":6069,"entry_id":5260,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":null,"person_id":null,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Farah Cherif Zahar","free_first_name":"Farah","free_last_name":"Cherif Zahar","norm_person":null}],"entry_title":"L\u2019\u00e9ternit\u00e9 du mouvement chez Ibn B\u00e2jja (Avempace) : de la d\u00e9finition g\u00e9n\u00e9rique \u00e0 la d\u00e9fintion num\u00e9rique. Le commentaire aux chapitres 1 et 2 du livre VIII de la Physique","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","main_title":{"title":"L\u2019\u00e9ternit\u00e9 du mouvement chez Ibn B\u00e2jja (Avempace) : de la d\u00e9finition g\u00e9n\u00e9rique \u00e0 la d\u00e9fintion num\u00e9rique. Le commentaire aux chapitres 1 et 2 du livre VIII de la Physique"},"abstract":"This article examines Ibn B\u0101\u01e7\u01e7a\u2019s (Avempace) interpretation of the first two chapters of the eighth book of Aristotle\u2019s Physics and what he has in mind when he describes Aristotle\u2019s proof as a demonstration of the eternity of motion \u201cin genus.\u201d His approach in the second appendix to book eight differs from the one he develops in the main commentary. In the former text, Ibn B\u0101\u01e7\u01e7a works on the distinction between essential and accidental successions, which leads him to realize that the accidental and thus possible successions\u2014 horizontal approach\u2014are not sufficient to guarantee the eternity of movement and then to adopt a vertical approach that goes back to the numerical identity of the circular continuous motion. We show to what extent Ibn B\u0101\u01e7\u01e7a\u2019s interpretation is indebted to Al-F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b\u2019s lost treatise On Changing Beings and also aim to highlight the role of this reading in the evolution of Averroes\u2019 interpretation. ","btype":3,"date":"2016","language":"French","online_url":"","doi_url":"","ti_url":"","categories":[{"id":21,"category_name":"Aristotle","link":"bib?categories[]=Aristotle"},{"id":37,"category_name":"Physics","link":"bib?categories[]=Physics"},{"id":28,"category_name":"al-F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b","link":"bib?categories[]=al-F\u0101r\u0101b\u012b"},{"id":17,"category_name":"Ibn B\u0101\u01e7\u01e7a","link":"bib?categories[]=Ibn B\u0101\u01e7\u01e7a"},{"id":24,"category_name":"Influence","link":"bib?categories[]=Influence"}],"authors":[],"works":[],"republication_of":null,"translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":5260,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Les \u00c9tudes Philosophiques","volume":"117","issue":"2","pages":"161\u2013216"}},"sort":["L\u2019\u00e9ternit\u00e9 du mouvement chez Ibn B\u00e2jja (Avempace) : de la d\u00e9finition g\u00e9n\u00e9rique \u00e0 la d\u00e9fintion num\u00e9rique. Le commentaire aux chapitres 1 et 2 du livre VIII de la Physique"]}

’Active Intellect’ in Avempace and Averroës: An Interpretative Issue, 2016
By: Daniel Bučan
Title ’Active Intellect’ in Avempace and Averroës: An Interpretative Issue
Type Article
Language English
Date 2016
Journal Synthesis Philosophica
Volume 62
Issue 2
Pages 345–358
Categories Ibn Bāǧǧa, De anima, Psychology
Author(s) Daniel Bučan
Publisher(s)
Translator(s)
This essay is about the understanding of the notion of active intellect in Ibn Bāǧǧa (Avempace) and Ibn Rushd (Averroës). The traditional interpretation of both Avempace’s and Averroës’ concept of active intellect is that they both understand it as the lowest celestial intelligence which is dator formarum, and that man thinks and cognizes intelligibles only by “connecting” with it in a quasi-mystic way; cognition being the active intellect’s granting ideas (formae or concepts) to man’s intellect. The author believes that both in Avempace’s and Averroës’ theory of cognition the notion of active intellect is only the highest function of human intellect, not a celestial entity. Based on such a presumption, as well as on the analysis of his theory, Avempace’s notion of iṭṭiṣāl bi-’aql fa’āl is interpreted not as a kind of mystic “conjunction” or “union” with a separate celestial entity, but as reaching the highest level of man’s intellect function in the continuity of the process of thinking. The same goes for Averroës’ theory, which is quite clearly presented in his Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect, where one can find practically direct confirmation for such an interpretation, because Averroës says that “conjunction with it seems to resemble more the conjunction of form in matter than it does the conjunction of agent with effect. The well-known difference between agent and effect is that the agent is external, but here there is no external agent”, or that active intellect “conjoins with us from the outset by conjunction of in-existence”. The author concludes that the issue of the active intellect in Islamic philosophy is not disambiguous – for different thinkers it was a different concept – only the function of the active intellect is always one and the same: producing ideas.

{"_index":"bib","_type":"_doc","_id":"5140","_score":null,"_source":{"id":5140,"authors_free":[{"id":5919,"entry_id":5140,"agent_type":"person","is_normalised":1,"person_id":625,"institution_id":null,"role":{"id":1,"role_name":"author"},"free_name":"Daniel Bu\u010dan","free_first_name":"Daniel ","free_last_name":"Bu\u010dan","norm_person":{"id":625,"first_name":"Daniel","last_name":"Bu\u010dan","full_name":"Daniel Bu\u010dan","short_ident":"","is_classical_name":0,"dnb_url":"","viaf_url":"https:\/\/viaf.org\/viaf\/73420981","db_url":"NULL","from_claudius":1,"link":"bib?authors[]=Daniel Bu\u010dan"}}],"entry_title":"\u2019Active Intellect\u2019 in Avempace and Averro\u00ebs: An Interpretative Issue","title_transcript":"","title_translation":"","main_title":{"title":"\u2019Active Intellect\u2019 in Avempace and Averro\u00ebs: An Interpretative Issue"},"abstract":"This essay is about the understanding of the notion of active intellect in Ibn B\u0101\u01e7\u01e7a (Avempace) and Ibn Rushd (Averro\u00ebs). The traditional interpretation of both Avempace\u2019s and Averro\u00ebs\u2019 concept of active intellect is that they both understand it as the lowest celestial intelligence which is dator formarum, and that man thinks and cognizes intelligibles only by \u201cconnecting\u201d with it in a quasi-mystic way; cognition being the active intellect\u2019s granting ideas (formae or concepts) to man\u2019s intellect. The author believes that both in Avempace\u2019s and Averro\u00ebs\u2019 theory of cognition the notion of active intellect is only the highest function of human intellect, not a celestial entity. Based on such a presumption, as well as on the analysis of his theory, Avempace\u2019s notion of i\u1e6d\u1e6di\u1e63\u0101l bi-\u2019aql fa\u2019\u0101l is interpreted not as a kind of mystic \u201cconjunction\u201d or \u201cunion\u201d with a separate celestial entity, but as reaching the highest level of man\u2019s intellect function in the continuity of the process of thinking. The same goes for Averro\u00ebs\u2019 theory, which is quite clearly presented in his Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect, where one can find practically direct confirmation for such an interpretation, because Averro\u00ebs says that \u201cconjunction with it seems to resemble more the conjunction of form in matter than it does the conjunction of agent with effect. The well-known difference between agent and effect is that the agent is external, but here there is no external agent\u201d, or that active intellect \u201cconjoins with us from the outset by conjunction of in-existence\u201d. The author concludes that the issue of the active intellect in Islamic philosophy is not disambiguous \u2013 for different thinkers it was a different concept \u2013 only the function of the active intellect is always one and the same: producing ideas.","btype":3,"date":"2016","language":"English","online_url":"","doi_url":"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.21464\/sp31208","ti_url":"","categories":[{"id":17,"category_name":"Ibn B\u0101\u01e7\u01e7a","link":"bib?categories[]=Ibn B\u0101\u01e7\u01e7a"},{"id":46,"category_name":"De anima","link":"bib?categories[]=De anima"},{"id":12,"category_name":"Psychology","link":"bib?categories[]=Psychology"}],"authors":[{"id":625,"full_name":"Daniel Bu\u010dan","role":1}],"works":[],"republication_of":null,"translation_of":null,"new_edition_of":null,"book":null,"booksection":null,"article":{"id":5140,"journal_id":null,"journal_name":"Synthesis Philosophica","volume":"62","issue":"2","pages":"345\u2013358"}},"sort":["\u2019Active Intellect\u2019 in Avempace and Averro\u00ebs: An Interpretative Issue"]}

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